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1 Introduction
Efforts to mitigate anthropogenic climate change are plagued by the public good property
of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Each country’s efforts to control emissions will ben-
efit all countries in a non-exclusive and non-rival manner. The absence of a supranational
authority to enforce efficient provision leads to the observed under-provision of emissions re-
ductions. As a potential remedy, international emission permit markets have been proposed
(Flachsland et al. 2009; Jaffe et al. 2009; Green et al. 2014).
On the one hand, international permit markets promise efficiency gains, as marginal abate-
ment costs are equalized across firms and countries, which is a necessary condition for
efficiency (Montgomery 1972). On the other hand, the total number of permits in such a
trading scheme is not necessarily efficient, because each country is free to decide on the num-
ber of permits it wants to issue within its own jurisdiction. In fact, some countries might
be tempted to issue more permits than they would do in the absence of international trade
in permits, because they might gain from selling permits to other countries. Helm (2003),
among others, shows that the non-cooperative choice of allowances under an international
permit market (which we will refer to as a “non-cooperative” international permit market)
might increase total emissions by so much that an international permit market becomes
unattractive for one or more countries.1 Yet, Carbone et al. (2009) demonstrate that inter-
national permit markets exhibit substantial potential for greenhouse gas reductions under
certain circumstances. In particular, linking the permit markets of countries with high car-
bon efficiency (i.e., high marginal benefits of greenhouse gas emissions) and high willingness
to pay for emissions reductions (i.e., high marginal damages) and countries with low carbon
efficiency and low willingness to pay leads to a Pareto improvement, in which efficiency
gains due to equalizing marginal abatement costs are realized and total emissions decline.
Despite these favourable characteristics, we have yet to observe the formation of many such
markets. Only Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway joined the European Union’s Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), and California and Québec linked their cap-and-trade systems
in 2014.2
In this paper, we offer a novel explanation for the observed reluctance in linking emission
permit markets. We show that, even in these instances where an international permit market
is beneficial to countries in the aforementioned model frameworks, this may not be the
1 Copeland and Taylor (2005) also find that, when taking international trade in goods into account, permit
trading between two countries may harm at least one country by causing a deterioration in the terms of
trade and/or raising the emission levels in unconstrained (with respect to emissions) countries.
2 Australia, which had already announced a plan to establish a domestic permit market and link it with
the EU’s scheme, abandoned these plans after a change in government. Moreover, the EU-ETS does not
strictly fit our definition of non-cooperative international permit market, because of the supranational
authority that the EU exerts on the national governments with respect to domestic emission permit levels.
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case anymore when we take the hierarchical structure of climate policy into account. By
“hierarchical” we mean that political decisions in modern societies are not made by a single
– let alone benevolent – decision maker. For example, representative democracies typically
feature a chain of delegation from voters to those who govern (Strøm 2000): (i) from voters
to elected representatives, (ii) from legislators to the executive branch (head of government),
(iii) from the head of government to the heads of different executive departments, and (iv)
from these heads to civil servants.3 In all these situations, one party (an agent) acts on
behalf of another (the principal) because the principal either lacks the information or skills
of the agent, or simply the time. Another reason for delegation is that the choice of an agent
with certain preferences enables the principal to credibly commit to a particular policy (e.g.,
Perino 2010). We focus on the latter purpose of delegation.
In the realm of climate policy, the most common form of delegation is that a country’s
government – the principal – decides upon the rough orientation of the policy (e.g., on
whether a permit market or a tax will be implemented) and delegates the implementation
of this policy to the minister of environment – the agent. The appointment of a minister with
a particular political agenda that is publicly observable and well-known can be regarded as
an (additional) instrument to credibly commit a country in the international policy arena.4
We model the principal-agent relationship outlined above in a two-country framework. In a
first step, the principals of both countries determine whether to link their domestic emission
permit markets to an international market that is formed if and only if both principals agree
to do so. Second, each principal selects one agent who is empowered to issue emission per-
mits. Then, the selected agents in both countries non-cooperatively determine the number
of emission permits issued to domestic firms. Finally, trading of permits – within or between
countries, contingent on the regime chosen in the first stage – takes place.
Assuming constant marginal damages, we find that the principals of both countries appoint
agents with the same preferences as they have themselves under domestic permit markets
but agents who care less about environmental damages than they do under an international
permit market regime. The intuition for this result is that permit choices by the agents
3 While for autocratic regimes the first link of this chain is obviously missing, we still observe delegation
patterns as in (ii), (iii) and (iv).
4 The EU’s climate policy, for example, is represented by the Commissioner for Climate Action whose mission
is to “formulate and implement climate policies and strategies” at the EU and the international level. This
post was created in 2010, splitting it from the environmental portfolio of the Directorate-General for
Environment, and thus it figures prominently in the EU’s policy portfolio. The appointment of Miguel
Arias Cañete as the Commissioner for Climate Action in November 2014 can be seen as a strong “signal”
to the international community, since Cañete is a politician of the centre-right and, in addition, his family
was involved in the oil industry. After accusations of possible conflicts of interest, he and his son resigned
from the boards of oil companies Petrolífera Ducar and Petrologis Canarias in September 2014 (Financial
Times 2014).
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are dominant strategies under the former regime but strategic substitutes under the latter
regime due to the international trade of permits. On an international market, it is beneficial
for each country to issue more permits and pass on part of the abatement effort to the
other country, because the marginal benefits from additional emissions, which are equal
to the equilibrium permit price, decrease by less than under domestic permit markets. The
principals in both countries can achieve higher issuance of permits by choosing agents with a
lower valuation of environmental damages than they exhibit themselves. While the previous
literature arrived at similar results in the absence of an international permit market (e.g.,
Segendorff 1998; Siqueira 2003 and Buchholz et al. 2005), these results crucially depended
on the assumption of increasing marginal damages of emissions.
Because global emissions unambiguously rise under the international permit market regime
compared to the case when principals do not have the possibility to delegate, an inter-
national permit market becomes less attractive to at least one principal. Thus, strategic
delegation renders the formation of an international market less likely. Overall, we find
that the conditions for the formation of an international permit market are less favourable
than suggested by the standard permit market literature, which neglects the hierarchical
structure of international climate policy.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. It builds on and extends the literature
on non-cooperative international permit markets, developed in Helm (2003), Carbone et al.
(2009), Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) and Helm and Pichler (2015). While these papers
assume that countries are represented by one welfare-maximizing decision maker (the gov-
ernment), we explicitly account for the principal-agent relationship between different bodies
involved in international policy making within a single country, for example, an incumbent
government or president that serves as the principal and a selected executive or government
agency that serves as an agent. In this regard, we heavily draw on the strategic delegation
literature.
The first papers on strategic delegation can be found in the Industrial Organization (IO) lit-
erature analyzing the delegation of managerial decisions from shareholders to chief executive
officers. Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) consider a manage-
rial compensation scheme that is based not only on profits but also on sales respectively
revenues. They show that in a duopoly or oligopoly with quantity-setting firms, the profits
of the owner who designs such a contract exceed those of her rivals who just prescribe their
managers to maximize profits, because the additional incentive device is common knowledge
(or can be inferred in repeated games) and thus serves as a credible commitment to a par-
ticular strategy. This reasoning does not only apply to markets in which the performance of
each firm depends on the choices of all firms (for an excellent survey see Kopel and Pezzino
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forthcoming). It is relevant for all environments of strategic interdependence in which one
player’s payoff depends on the decisions of other players. It comes as no surprise that the
concept of strategic delegation subsequently found its way into the literature on negotiation
and cooperation (Crawford and Varian 1979; Sobel 1981; Jones 1989; Burtraw 1992, 1993;
Segendorff 1998) where it has been utilized in various contexts with inter-agent spillovers,
such as environmental policy or the provision of public goods more generally. In contrast
to the early IO papers, the principal in these papers does not misrepresent her own prefer-
ences by incentivizing the agent with an additional instrument. Instead, she is able to raise
her payoff by delegating the task at hand to an agent with preferences different from her
own. It is also worth mentioning that strategic delegation is labeled as “strategic voting”
whenever the principal is the electorate or, more precisely, the median voter and the elected
government is the agent (Persson and Tabellini 1992).
Siqueira (2003), Buchholz et al. (2005), Roelfsema (2007) and Hattori (2010) analyse strate-
gic voting in the context of environmental policy. While the first three contributions exclu-
sively focus on environmental taxation, Hattori (2010) also examines the outcome of strate-
gic voting under emissions caps. Siqueira (2003) and Buchholz et al. (2005) both find that
voters’ selection of agents is biased toward politicians who are less green than the median
voter. By electing a more “conservative” politician, the home country commits itself to a
lower tax on pollution, shifting the burden of a cleaner environment to the foreign country.
By contrast, Roelfsema (2007) accounts for emissions leakage through shifts in produc-
tion and finds that median voters may delegate to politicians who place greater weight on
environmental damage than they do themselves, whenever their preferences for the environ-
ment relative to their valuation of firms’ profits are sufficiently strong. However, this result
breaks down in the case of perfect pollution spillovers, such as the emission and diffusion
of greenhouse gases as in our paper. Hattori (2010) allows for different degrees of product
differentiation and alternative modes of competition, i.e., competition on quantities but also
on prices. His general finding is that, when the policy choices are strategic substitutes (com-
plements), a less (more) green policy maker is elected in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
As in Siqueira (2003) and Roelfsema (2007), the agents selected by the principals in our
model do not engage in bargaining but rather set environmental policies non-cooperatively.
In contrast to the aforementioned papers, we examine delegation not only under caps but
also under an international permit market. We find that an international permit market in-
duces strategic substitutability of policy choices and thus changes the incentives to delegate
strategically. In fact, as we abstract from convex damages, the international permit market
is the only source of strategic delegation incentives in our model.
Strategic delegation in the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities more
generally has been examined by Kempf and Rossignol (2013) and Loeper (2017). The authors
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of the former paper show that any international agreement that is negotiated by national
delegates involves higher public good provisions than in the case of non-cooperative policies,
taking feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints into account. In their model, the choice of
delegates is highly dependent on the distributive characteristics of the proposed agreement.
Loeper (2017) proves that whether cooperation between national delegates is beneficial only
depends on the type of public good considered and, more specifically, on the curvature of
the demand for the public good but not on voters’ preferences, the magnitude of the cross-
border externalities, nor the size, bargaining power or efficiency of each country in providing
the public good. Another strand of this literature deals with the provision of public goods
in federations that are characterized by fiscal arrangements or different majoritarian rules;
see, e.g., Besley and Coate (2003), Redoano and Scharf (2004), Dur and Roelfsema (2005),
Harstad (2010) and Christiansen (2013).
The broader literature on linking offers several explanations for why “bottom-up” (or non-
cooperative in our terminology) approaches to permit trading have not been successful.
Among the obstacles that have been identified are different levels of ambition, competing
domestic policy objectives, objections to financial transfers and the difficulty of regulatory
coordination (Green et al. 2014). We contribute to this literature by suggesting that the
hierarchical structures underlying environmental policy may well be a reason for the rejec-
tion of otherwise beneficial policies. With respect to hierarchical policy structures within
countries, our paper is related to Habla and Winkler (2013) and Marchiori et al. (2017), in
which the influence of legislative lobbying on the formation of international permit markets
and on international environmental agreements, respectively, is analysed.
2 The model
We consider two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2 and −i = {1, 2} \ i.5 In each country i,
emissions ei imply country-specific benefits from the productive activities of a representative
firm, characterized by a concave quadratic benefit function B(ei), while global emissions
E = e1 + e2 cause linearly increasing country-specific damages, Di(E):6
Bi(ei) =
1
φi
ei(i − 12ei) , B
′
i(ei) =
i − ei
φi
, B′′i = −
1
φi
, (1a)
Di(E) = δiE , D′i = δi , D′′i = 0 , (1b)
5 All our results can be generalized to n countries in a straightforward manner.
6 We employ the assumption of constant marginal damages for two reasons. First, together with the assump-
tion of a quadratic benefit function it allows to derive closed-form analytical solutions. Second, it poses
the least favourable conditions for strategic delegation to occur. Yet, we show that strategic delegation
still occurs in the case of an international permit market. We further discuss the assumption of a linear
damage function in Section 7.
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where i ≥ ei denotes business-as-usual emissions in the absence of any climate policy,
φi > 0 is a parameter that is inversely related to the carbon efficiency and δi ≥ 0 denotes the
constant marginal environmental damages in country i. In addition, we define the following
abbreviations:
 ≡ 1 + 2 , φ ≡ φ1 + φ2 . (2)
2.1 Non-cooperative international climate policy
Both countries establish perfectly competitive domestic emission permit markets and deter-
mine, non-cooperatively, the number of permits ωi issued to a representative domestic firm.
As firms in all countries i require emission permits for an amount equal to the emissions ei
they produce, global emissions are given by the sum of emission permits issued, E = ω1+ω2.
Countries may agree to link their domestic markets and form an international market. Then
permits issued by both countries are non-discriminatorily traded on a perfectly competitive
international market.
Restricting emissions imposes a compliance cost on the representative firms and thus reduces
profits. If permits are traded internationally, firms have an opportunity to either generate
additional profits by selling permits or reduce the compliance cost by buying permits from
abroad. Thus, the profits of the representative firm read:
pii(ei) = Bi(ei) + p(ωi − ei) , i = 1, 2 , (3)
where p is the price of permits on an international market. If countries decide against linking,
ωi = ei holds in equilibrium and the second term vanishes.
2.2 Agency Structure
In each country i there is a principal whose utility is given by:
Vi = pii(ei)− θi,PDi(E) . (4)
Without loss of generality, we normalize θi,P to unity. In addition, there is a continuum of
agents of mass one in each country i, whose utilities are given by:
Wi = pii(ei)− θiDi(E) , (5)
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where θi is a preference parameter that is continuously distributed on the bounded interval
[θmini , θmaxi ]. We assume that the boundaries θmini and θmaxi are such that (i) the principals’
preferences are represented in the continuum of agents, i.e., 1 ∈ [θmini , θmaxi ], and (ii) the
principal can always find her preferred agent within the continuum of agents.
In each country, all agents and the principal have equal stakes in the profits of the domestic
firm but differ with respect to environmental damages.7 This may be either because damages
are heterogeneously distributed or because the monetary valuation of homogenous physical
environmental damage differs. We assume that all individuals (principals and agents) are
selfish in the sense that they maximize their respective utilities, i.e., the principal in country
i chooses her actions to maximize Vi, while each agent in country i makes decisions to
maximize his utility Wi.
We assume that preference parameters of all individuals are common knowledge. Thus, we
abstract from all issues related to asymmetric information.8
2.3 Structure and timing of the game
We model the hierarchical structure of climate policy as a non-cooperative sequential game.
In the first stage, the “choice of regime”, the principals in both countries simultaneously de-
termine whether an international permit market is formed. Because countries are sovereign,
an international permit market only forms if the principals in both countries consent to
doing so. In the second stage, the principals simultaneously select an agent from the contin-
uum of available agents. In stage three, these selected agents simultaneously decide on the
number of emission allowances that are distributed to the representative domestic firms. In
the final stage, emission permits are traded. The complete structure and timing of the game
are summarized as follows:
1. Choice of Regime:
Principals in both countries simultaneously decide whether the domestic permit mar-
kets are merged to form an international market.
2. Strategic Delegation:
Principals in both countries simultaneously select an agent.
7 This is equivalent to assuming that all agents and the principal equally suffer from environmental damages
but have different stakes in firm profits, as dividing by θi is just a positive affine transformation of the
utility functions.
8 Although this may seem restrictive at first glance, it is not in the context of our model framework. One
principal’s incentive to strategically delegate to an agent stems exclusively from the other principal’s ability
to observe the principal’s and agent’s preferences. Moreover, the assumption is not unrealistic, as high-level
political delegates have, in general, well-known political agendas.
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3. Emission Allowance Choices:
Selected agents in both countries simultaneously choose the number of emission per-
mits issued to the domestic firms.
4. Permit Trade:
Depending on the regime established in the first stage, emission permits are traded
on perfectly competitive domestic or international permit markets.
Despite being highly stylized, this model captures essential characteristics of the hierarchical
structure of domestic and international environmental policy. As we discuss in greater detail
in Section 7, the structure of the model is compatible with various delegation mechanisms
present in modern societies. For example, the principal might be the median voter of the
electorate while the agent represents the elected government. Alternatively, the principal
might be the parliament that delegates a decision to an agent, for example, to the minister
of the environment.
We solve the game by backward induction. Therefore, we first determine the equilibrium
levels of emission permits for the two different regimes, which depend on the preferences of
the selected agents in both countries. Second, we determine the preferences of the agents
whom the principals select. Finally, we analyse under which conditions the principals in
both countries consent to the formation of an international permit market and compare this
to the case when there is no possibility for the principals to delegate strategically.
3 Permit market equilibrium and delegated permit choice
In the last stage and in the case of domestic emission permit markets, the market clearing
condition implies that ωi = ei for both countries i = 1, 2. Profit maximization of the
representative firm leads to an equalization of marginal benefits with the country-specific
equilibrium permit price pi:
pi(ωi) = B′i(ei) =
i − ωi
φi
, i = 1, 2 . (6)
In the case of an international permit market, there is only one permit market price, which
implies that, in equilibrium, the marginal benefits of all participating countries are equalized:
p(E) = B′1
(
e1(E)
)
= B′2
(
e2(E)
)
= i − ei(E)
φi
. (7)
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In addition, the market clearing condition:
ω1 + ω2 = B′−11
(
p(E)
)
+B′−12
(
p(E)
)
= e1(E) + e2(E) = E , (8)
implicitly determines the permit price p(E) in the market equilibrium as a function of the
total number of issued emission allowances E:
p(E) = − E
φ
. (9)
Equations (7) and (9) also imply:
p′(E) = p′ = B
′′
1B
′′
2
B′′1 +B′′2
= − 1
φ
< 0 , e′i(E) = e′i =
B′′−i
B′′i +B′′−i
= φi
φ
∈ (0, 1) . (10)
Naturally, the permit price goes down as global supply increases, and this increase is ab-
sorbed by both countries.
3.1 Delegated permit choice under a domestic permit market
In case no international permit market has been formed in the first stage of the game, the
selected agent from country i sets the level of emission permits ωi to maximize:9
WDi = Bi(ωi)− θiDi(E) , (11)
subject to equation (6) and given the permit choice ω−i of the other country. Then, the
reaction function of the selected agent i is implicitly given by:
B′i(ωi)− θiD′i = 0 , (12)
implying that the selected agent in country i trades off the marginal benefits of issuing more
permits against the corresponding environmental damage costs. The following proposition
holds:
Proposition 1 (Unique NE in stage three under domestic permit markets)
For any given vector Θ = (θ1, θ2) of preferences of the selected agents under domestic permit
markets, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning in stage three, in
which all countries i = 1, 2 simultaneously set emission permit levels ωi to maximize (11)
subject to equation (6) and taking the permit level ω−i of the other country as given.
The proofs of all propositions and corollaries are relegated to the Appendix.
9 Superscript “D” means “domestic”, indicating the regime in which only domestic permit markets exist.
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We denote the Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning in stage three by ΩD(Θ) =(
ωD1 (Θ), ωD2 (Θ)
)
and the global emission level in this equilibrium by ED(Θ). For later use, we
analyse how the equilibrium emission levels change with a marginal change in the preferences
of the selected agent in country i.
Corollary 1 (Stage three comparative statics under domestic permit markets)
The following conditions hold for the levels of national emissions ωDi , ωD−i and total emis-
sions ED in the Nash equilibrium ΩD(Θ):
dωDi (Θ)
dθi
< 0 ,
dωD−i(Θ)
dθi
= 0 , dE
D(Θ)
dθi
< 0 . (13)
Corollary 1 states that domestic emission levels ωDi of country i and global emissions ED
are lower in equilibrium when the preference parameter θi is higher, i.e., when country i’s
selected agent cares more about the environment. Moreover, permit choices are dominant
strategies due to the linearity of the damage function.
3.2 Delegated permit choice under an international permit market
If an international permit market is formed in the first stage, country i’s selected agent
chooses ωi to maximize:10
W Ii = Bi
(
ei(E)
)
+ p(E) [ωi − ei(E)]− θiDi(E) , (14)
subject to equations (7) and (8) and given ω−i. Taking into account that p(E) = B′i
(
ei(E)
)
,
the reaction function of the agent in country i is given by:
p(E) + p′ [ωi − ei(E)]− θiD′i = 0 . (15)
Again, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning at stage three:
Proposition 2 (Unique NE in stage three under international permit markets)
For any given vector Θ = (θ1, θ2) of preferences of the selected agents under an interna-
tional permit market, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning at
stage three, in which both countries simultaneously set the levels of emission permits ωi to
maximize (14) subject to equations (7) and (8) and taking the permit level ω−i of the other
country as given.
10 Superscript “I” means “international”, indicating the regime in which an international permit market is
formed.
10
Denote the Nash equilibrium by ΩI(Θ) =
(
ωI1(Θ), ωI2(Θ)
)
and the global equilibrium emis-
sions by EI(Θ). Then, by summing up the reaction functions for both countries, we obtain
the equilibrium permit price p
(
EI(Θ)
)
, which is equal to the average marginal environmental
damage costs of the selected agents:
p
(
EI(Θ)
)
= 12
[
θiD
′
i + θ−iD′−i
]
. (16)
Inserting the equilibrium price p
(
EI(Θ)
)
back into the reaction function (15) yields:
ωi − ei(E) = 12p′
[
θiD
′
i − θ−iD′−i
]
, (17)
revealing that, in equilibrium, the country whose agent exhibits above-average marginal
damages is the permit buyer, whereas the country whose agent’s marginal damages are
below average is the permit seller.
Again, we analyse the influence of the selected agents’ preferences on the equilibrium permit
choices:
Corollary 2 (Stage three comparative statics under int’l permit markets)
The following conditions hold for the levels of emission allowances ωIi , ωI−i and total emis-
sions EI in the Nash equilibrium ΩI(Θ):
dωIi (Θ)
dθi
< 0 ,
dωI−i(Θ)
dθi
> 0 , dE
I(Θ)
dθi
< 0 . (18)
As before, an increase in θi decreases the equilibrium permit level ωIi and overall emis-
sions, but, in contrast to the domestic permit markets regime, this increases the equilibrium
allowance choice ωI−i of the other country, i.e., the international permit market renders
countries’ permit choices strategic substitutes. Furthermore, note that domestic emissions
are not equal to domestic allowance choices. In fact, equilibrium emissions decrease in both
countries if θi increases in one of the countries, as a reduction in total emission permits
increases the equilibrium permit price; see equation (10).
4 Strategic delegation
We now turn to the selection of agents by the principals in the second stage of the game.
We assume that the bounds θmini and θmaxi , which determine the minimum and maximum
preference parameters of agents to whom the principals can delegate, are such that principals
can always find an agent with their preferred preferences.
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4.1 Strategic delegation under domestic permit markets
First, assume a domestic permit market regime. Then, the principal in country i selects an
agent with preferences θi such that
V Di = Bi
(
ωDi (Θ)
)−Di(ED(Θ)) (19)
is maximized given the Nash equilibrium ΩD(Θ) of the subgame beginning in the third stage
and the preferences θ−i of the selected agent in the other country. We derive the following
first-order condition:
B′i
(
ωDi (Θ)
)dωDi (Θ)
dθi
−D′i
dED(Θ)
dθi
= 0 , (20)
which implicitly determines the best-response function θDi (θ−i).
Taking into account the equilibrium of the third stage, in particular equation (12), we re-
write the first-order condition to yield:
(1− θi)D′i
dED(Θ)
dθi
= −B′i
(
ωDi (Θ)
)dωD−i(Θ)
dθi
= 0 . (21)
This states that, in equilibrium, the marginal costs of strategic delegation have to equal
its marginal benefits. The costs of choosing an agent with lower environmental preferences
(left-hand side) are given by the additional (compared to θi,P = 1) marginal damage caused
by the increase in total emissions. Benefits from strategic delegation (right-hand side) accrue
if the principal can pass on some of the abatement burden to the other country. This holds
if permit choices in the third stage are strategic substitutes, i.e., dωD−i(Θ)/dθi > 0. In case
of domestic permit markets and constant marginal damages, permit choices in the third
stage are dominant strategies and, thus, the right-hand side of equation (21) is zero. As a
result, the above condition is only satisfied if θi = 1. Hence, there is no incentive for the
principal to strategically delegate and the subgame beginning in stage two exhibits a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which principals choose θDi = 1. We refer to this case
as self-representation.
Proposition 3 (Unique NE in stage two under domestic permit markets)
Given a domestic permit market regime, the subgame beginning at stage two, in which the
principals of both countries i = 1, 2 simultaneously select agents with preferences θi to max-
imize (19) subject to ΩD(Θ) and given the choice θ−i of the principal in country −i exhibits
a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, in which principals represent themselves, i.e.,
ΘD = (θD1 , θD2 ) = (1, 1).
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4.2 Strategic delegation under an international permit market
Now assume an international permit market regime. Then, the principal in country i selects
an agent with preferences θi to maximize
V Ii = Bi
(
ei
(
EI(Θ)
))
+ p
(
EI(Θ)
) [
ωIi (Θ)− ei
(
EI(Θ)
)]−Di(EI(Θ)) , (22)
given the Nash equilibrium ΩI(Θ) of the subgame beginning in the third stage and the
preferences θ−i of the selected agent in the other country. Now, the first-order condition
reads:
p
(
EI(Θ)
)dωIi (Θ)
dθi
+
{
p′
[
ωIi (Θ)− ei
(
EI(Θ)
)]−D′i} dEI(Θ)dθi = 0 , (23)
which implicitly defines the best-response function θIi (θ−i). Compared to the case of domes-
tic permit markets, an additional term enters the principals’ trade-off due to the terms of
trade on the international permit market. Again, we re-write the first-order condition by
taking into account the equilibrium in the third stage, in particular equation (15):
(1− θi)D′i
dEI(Θ)
dθi
= −p(EI(Θ))dωI−i(Θ)
dθi
. (24)
Similarly to equation (21), this equation says that, in equilibrium, the marginal costs of
strategic delegation have to equal its marginal benefits, but now the marginal benefits are
non-zero. The intuition is that due to the strategic substitutability of permit choices, part of
the abatement effort can – ceteris paribus – be passed on to the other country. The marginal
benefits are, thus, given by the marginal production benefits (of having to abate less) which
are equal across countries and given by the uniform permit price p, times the decrease in
the number of permits that the other country issues. There exists a unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the subgame beginning at stage two:
Proposition 4 (Unique NE in stage two under international permit markets)
Given an international permit market regime, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the subgame beginning at stage two, in which the principals of both countries
i = 1, 2 simultaneously select agents with preferences θi to maximize (22) subject to ΩI(Θ)
and given the choice θ−i of the principal in country −i.
The following corollary characterizes the properties of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
Corollary 3 (Properties of NE under international permit markets)
For the unique Nash equilibrium ΘI , the following conditions hold:
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1. The principals of both countries choose θIi < 1.
2. Principal i delegates more strongly, i.e., chooses an agent with lower preference pa-
rameter θi, the lower are her marginal damages and the less her marginal benefits
decrease. In particular, it holds that
θIi < θ
I
−i ⇔
δi
φi
<
δ−i
φ−i
(25)
3. If the condition
δi
δ−i
<
φi
2φi + 3φ−i
<
1
2 (26)
holds, then the principal in country i delegates to an agent with a negative preference
parameter θIi < 0.
Corollary 3 implies that, in the case of an international permit market, self-representation
(θIi = 1) can never be an equilibrium outcome, as the interaction through the permit market
ensures that permit choices in stage three of the game are strategic substitutes. In other
words, the principals in both countries attempt to shift the burden of emissions abatement
to the other country by delegating the choice of emission permits to agents who value
environmental damages strictly less than they do themselves (θIi < 1).
The principals delegate more strongly, i.e., they choose an agent with lower θi, the lower
are their marginal damages and the less their marginal benefits fall. The intuition for the
former result is that the principals’ willingness to tolerate higher global emissions rises with
lower marginal damages. As a result, an agent with lower θi, who will issue more domestic
permits and thereby increase global emissions, can be chosen. If marginal benefits fall less
steeply, the principal enjoys higher marginal benefits from choosing a lower θi because her
country will now absorb a bigger share of the additional permits issued by the less green
agent; see equation (10). As a consequence, the principal in one country will also delegate
more strongly than her counterpart in the other country if her marginal damages are lower
and the production benefits fall by less than in the other country.
The incentive to strategically delegate may be so strong for one country that the principal
prefers to empower an agent with a negative preference parameter θi, which implies that the
agent perceives environmental damages as a benefit. This happens whenever one principal’s
marginal damages are sufficiently small compared to the other principal’s marginal damages
(a necessary condition is that they are less than one half).
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Previous studies analysed strategic delegation under either an environmental tax or an en-
vironmental standard (e.g., Siqueira 2003; Buchholz et al. 2005; Roelfsema 2007). They also
found that, with perfect pollution spillovers as in our model, principals delegate in equilib-
rium to agents that are less green than they are themselves. However, in these papers this
result crucially depends on the assumption of increasing marginal damages, which induce
strategic substitutability among the agents’ policy choices. One of our main contributions
in this paper is to show that even with constant marginal damages strategic delegation will
occur in case of an international permit market.
5 Formation of international emission permit markets
We now turn to the first stage of the game and the question which permit market regime R ∈
{D, I} will be established. To answer this question, we first examine the circumstances under
which the principals in both countries consent to the formation of an international permit
market. Then, we discuss how strategic delegation induces less favourable circumstances for
an international emission permit market to form.
5.1 The choice of regime
Recall that an international permit market only forms if it is in the best interest of the
principals in both countries. In considering their preferred regime choices, the principals in
both countries anticipate the influence of the regime choice on the outcomes of the following
stages. Thus, principals are aware that the regime choice R ∈ {D, I} in the first stage induces
preference parameters for the selected agents given by ΘR and emission allowance choices of
ΩR(ΘR). The principal in country i prefers an international emission permit market if her
utility difference between the international and the domestic permit market regime – given
the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the second and third stages of the game under the
respective regime – is strictly positive. Formally, this implies:
∆Vi ≡ Bi
(
ei
(
EI(ΘI)
))−Bi(ωDi (ΘD))+ p(EI(ΘI))[ωIi (ΘI)− ei(EI(ΘI))]
− θMi
[
Di
(
EI(ΘI)
)−Di(ED(ΘD))] > 0 . (27)
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Then, an international permit market forms if and only if it is a Pareto improvement for
the principals compared to domestic permit markets:11
∆Vi > 0 ∧ ∆V−i > 0 . (28)
5.2 Formation of international permit markets in the absence of delegation
It is illustrative to first show under which circumstances an international permit market
forms in the absence of delegation. For this case, equation (27) yields:
∆Vi = V Ii (ΘP )− V Di (ΘP )
= 18(δ−i − δi) [φi(δ−i + δi) + 2φiδi + 2φ−i(δ−i − δi)] ,
(29)
where ΘP = (θ1,P , θ2,P ) = (1, 1) implies that principals choose agents with the same prefer-
ences as their own. Without loss of generality, assume that country i exhibits lower marginal
damages, i.e., δi < δ−i. According to equation (17), this implies that country i is the per-
mit seller in case of an international permit market regime. Then the payoff difference as
measured by (29) is always strictly positive. In other words, the permit seller always prefers
the international permit market to domestic permit markets. But what if i were the permit
buyer, i.e., δi > δ−i? In this case, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for principal i
to support an international permit market is that φi < φ−i, i.e., i’s marginal benefits fall
by more than −i’s marginal benefits. In addition, whenever an international permit mar-
ket forms, global emissions are lower compared to a domestic permit market regime. We
summarize this finding in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Conditions for a permit market to form without delegation)
In the absence of delegation, a necessary condition for an international permit market to
form is that the country with the higher carbon efficiency also exhibits higher marginal
environmental damages:
φi < φ−i ∧ δi > δ−i . (30)
Under these conditions, global emissions are also lower in the international permit market
regime compared to the domestic permit market regime.
11 We assume that country i’s principal only favours an international permit market over domestic permit
markets if ∆Vi is strictly positive. The intuition behind this tie-breaking rule is the assumption that
domestic permit markets represent the status quo. If linking domestic permit markets to an international
market induces some positive costs , then ∆Vi >  > 0 has to hold for an international permit market
to be favourable. However, this tie-breaking rule does not qualitatively affect our results, and any other
tie-breaking rule is permissible.
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Proposition 5 states that an international permit market will (if at all) only form if we match
a country with high carbon efficiency and high willingness to pay for abating environmental
damages to a country with low carbon efficiency and low willingness to pay. However,
whenever an international permit market forms, it is a win-win situation in the sense that,
compared to a domestic permit market regime, it is (i) a Pareto improvement from the
principals’ point of view and (ii) global emissions are lower.
5.3 Formation of international permit markets in the presence of delegation
In case of strategic delegation, the payoff difference for the principal in country i reads:
∆Vi = V Ii (ΘI)− V Di (ΘD)
= 118
[
δ2i (2φ−i − 6φi) + δiδ−i(6φi − 14φ−i) + δ2−i(3φi + 2φi)
]
.
(31)
Note that ΘD = ΘP = (1, 1) and, thus, the second term in the first line of equation (31) is
identical to the second term of equation (29). Therefore, the possibility of delegation only
changes the principal’s welfare in case of an international emission permit market. In fact,
strategic delegation renders the formation of an international permit market less likely, as
the following proposition states:
Proposition 6 (Effect of delegation on formation of int’l permit market)
Strategic delegation renders the formation of an international permit market less likely in
the following sense:
1. It cannot happen that an international permit market forms under strategic delegation
while it would not have formed without delegation.
2. It can happen that an international permit market regime constitutes a Pareto im-
provement for the principals over a domestic permit market regime without delegation
but is not a Pareto improvement in case of strategic delegation.
To prove Proposition 6, we first show that in case condition (30) holds, the permit buyer, who
is pivotal for the formation of an international permit market in the absence of delegation,
loses under strategic delegation and, therefore, is less likely to consent to the formation
of an international permit market. In addition, we show that it cannot happen that an
international permit market forms under strategic delegation while it would not have formed
without delegation. Together, this implies that strategic delegation leads to less favourable
conditions, compared to the situation without delegation, for an international emission
permit market to be a Pareto improvement.
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Note that condition (30) is a necessary condition for an international permit market to be
mutually beneficial in both cases, with and without delegation. As a consequence, we can
restrict attention to cases where condition (30) holds. Under these circumstances, the prin-
cipal of country −i, who values environmental damages less (i.e., δ−i < δi) delegates more
strategically (i.e., θI−i < θIi ) in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the international
permit market with delegation, according to Corollary 3 part two. This also implies that
θ−iδ−i < θiδi. Thus, the roles of permit seller and permit buyer in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in case of an international permit market regime do not change because
of delegation. That is, in case of an international permit market, if a country is the permit
seller in the absence of delegation, it is also the permit seller in the presence of strategic
delegation.
Finally, we investigate how global emissions under an international permit market with
strategic delegation compare to global emissions under a domestic permit market regime.
The following proposition states the results:
Proposition 7 (Global emissions under int’l permit market with delegation)
In equilibrium the following statements hold:
1. Under an international permit market, global emissions are strictly higher with strate-
gic delegation than without.
2. A necessary condition for an international permit market with delegation to be mutu-
ally beneficial for the principals in both countries is that global emissions under the
international permit market regime are lower than under a domestic permit market
regime.
Proposition 7 provides a straightforward intuition why strategic delegation leads to less
favourable circumstances for an international permit market to form. First, everything else
equal, strategic delegation increases the equilibrium emissions under an international permit
market regime. Second, as lower global emissions compared to the domestic permit mar-
ket regime are a necessary condition for the formation of an international permit market,
strategic delegation reduces the parameter space for which an international permit market
regime is a Pareto improvement from the principals’ perspective.
6 Numerical Illustration
We illustrate our main findings with a numerical example. As discussed in Section 5, con-
dition (30) is a necessary condition for an international permit market to be mutually
beneficial in both cases, with and without delegation of permit choices. Consequently, we
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Without strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θR2 ωR1 ωR2 eR1 eR2 ER V R1 V R2
R = D 1 1 2.87 0.94 3.81 4.42 2.70
R = I 1 1 2.89 0.74 2.66 0.96 3.63 4.48 2.73
With strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θR2 ωR1 ωR2 eR1 eR2 ER V R1 V R2
R = D 1 1 2.87 0.94 3.81 4.42 2.70
R = I −0.50 0.96 3.1 0.65 2.78 0.98 3.75 4.49 2.67
Table 1: Overview of the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria without and
with strategic delegation for the numerical example detailed in the Appendix.
choose parameter constellations such that one country (or country block) exhibits a low car-
bon efficiency (which is equivalent to low marginal abatement costs), i.e., a high φi, and its
principal a low willingness to pay (WTP) to prevent environmental damages, i.e., a low δi,
and the second country has a high carbon efficiency and its principle a high WTP to prevent
environmental damages, i.e., low φ−i and high δ−i. One can think of the former country
(henceforth country 1) as a country in transition, while country 2 represents a developed
country.
We calibrate the example to China (country 1) and the European Union (country 2), using
relative energy productivities taken from the OECD Green Growth Indicators database as
a proxy for carbon efficiencies and using relative WTPs based on the estimates provided
in Carlsson et al. (2012). Details of the calibration are given in the Appendix. The results
are illustrated in Table 1. Without delegation, an international permit market comes into
existence, as the principals of both the EU and China have higher payoffs under an inter-
national permit market regime than under domestic permit markets. Furthermore, China is
the seller of emission permits, which is in line with findings from Carbone et al. (2009). The
EU, being the high-damage country block, benefits from both an overall decrease in total
emissions and a decrease in marginal abatement costs.
In the case of strategic delegation, nothing changes under domestic permit markets, as the
principles in both countries have no incentive to strategically delegate. This is also evident in
Figure 1, which depicts the reaction functions from the delegation stage for the principals
in both countries. The reactions functions in case of the domestic permit market regime
are constant at one. In the case of an international permit market, however, the delegation
incentives for the permit-selling country are much stronger than those for the permit-buying
country, as stated in Corollary 3 and shown in Figure 1. The principal of country 1 (China),
even delegates to an agent with negative environmental preferences, i.e., an agent who
perceives climate change as a benefit. By doing so, the number of emission permits issued in
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θ2
θ1
Figure 1: Reaction functions of the principals in country 1 (China, solid) and country 2 (EU,
dashed) under the regimes R = D (black) and R = I (gray) at the delegation
stage.
China rises notably compared to self-representation, whereas the EU decreases the number
of permits compared to self-representation. Overall emissions rise under strategic delegation
relative to self-representation in the case of an international permit market. While the
principal of country 1 still prefers an international permit market regime, the principal of
the other country is better off under domestic permit markets. In contrast to the case of
self-representation, no international market will emerge.
This example highlights that, while the formation of an international permit market may
be beneficial for all principals if they represent themselves, this is less likely to be the case
under strategic delegation. The reason is that there are incentives to delegate to less green
agents under an international permit market which are absent in case of domestic permit
markets. This commitment by the principals leads to higher aggregate emissions and makes
the principal of the high-damage country (the EU) less inclined to consent to the formation
of an international permit market.
7 Discussion
Our explicit discussion of the hierarchical structure of international environmental poli-
cies may shed light on the puzzle of why we have yet to witness the formation of many
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non-cooperative international permit markets. The advantage of an international permit
market, in which individual countries non-cooperatively determine permit issuance, over
non-cooperative domestic environmental policies is the equalization of marginal benefits
from emissions across all countries, which is a necessary condition for efficiency. However,
from the principals’ perspective, the efficiency gains from equalizing marginal benefits across
countries come at the additional cost of strategic delegation, i.e., the incentive to delegate
the emission permit choice to agents who have a lower valuation for the environment than
they have themselves. As this incentive is absent under a domestic permit market regime,
there is an additional trade-off favouring the domestic permit market regime, which has
been overlooked in the standard non-cooperative permit market setting.
Our analytical derivation of results hinges on the particular functional forms we assumed
for the benefit and damage functions; see equations (1). In particular, the assumption of
constant marginal damages may seem restrictive. The reason for this assumption is twofold:
First, it allows for an analytical solution of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Second,
constant marginal damages pose the least favourable conditions for strategic delegation
to occur, as permit choices are dominant strategies in case of domestic permit markets.
Yet, we show that strategic delegation still occurs in the case of an international permit
market. In addition, our assumptions of quadratic benefits and linear damages are not
unrealistic. Klepper and Peterson (2006) show that abatement cost curves (which, in our
model, correspond to the benefits of unabated emissions) can well be approximated by
quadratic functions. The linear damage specification is in line with the assumptions made
in complex integrated assessment or general equilibrium climate-economy models (see, e.g.,
Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, Golosov et al. 2014), in which climate damage is approximately
linear in the GHG concentration in the atmosphere. This is because, typically, temperature
is assumed to increase logarithmically with concentrations, whereas damage is assumed to
be exponential or polynomial in temperature.12 Finally, our results are qualitatively robust
to strictly convex damage specifications. In fact, we discuss the case of sufficiently quadratic
benefit and damage functions in detail in Habla and Winkler (2016).
We analyse a particular environmental policy in our model: emission permit markets. How-
ever, our results do not hinge on the domestic policy being an emissions permit scheme,
which we chose for analytical convenience. They would still hold if we considered domestic
emission tax schemes instead, because without uncertainty price and quantity regulations
are equivalent. In addition, whether permits are grandfathered or auctioned is inconsequen-
tial in our model, as firm profits accrue to the individual agents in the respective countries.
12 See also Burke et al. (2015) as one of the very few empirical papers estimating macroeconomic damages
due to temperature increases. They find that damages, measured as deviations of economic productivity
from a country-specific temperature optimum, are convex in temperature.
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In the case of grandfathering, endowing firms with permits for free implies higher profits for
the firms and, thus, higher income for the individual agents, whereas in the case of auction-
ing, the revenues from the auction directly accrue to the individual agents, for example, in
the form of a lump-sum transfer.
Despite our highly stylized, four-stage principal-agent model, we argue that both the timing
of the game and the delegation procedure are compatible with different principal-agent
relationships that arise in the hierarchical policy procedures of modern societies. We wish
to illustrate this claim with two examples. First, assume that the principal is the median
voter and the agent is an elected government.13 Then, the four-stage game translates into
the following sequence of events. In stage one, the median voter decides on the regime.
While this may be unusual in representative democracies, it is rather the rule in direct
democracies such as Switzerland, where binary and one-shot decisions are often made by
the electorate via referendum. In the second stage, the median voter elects a government
that determines the number of allowances issued to the domestic firms in the third stage.
Following this interpretation, we have a strategic voting game between the electorate and
the elected government.
Second, assume that the principal is the parliament of a representative democracy and
the agent is, for example, the minister of environment. Now, the parliament determines
the regime in the first stage. In the second stage, it elects the executive, for example, the
minister of environment, who then determines the number of emission allowances in the
third stage. While it is rather unusual that the parliament, i.e., the legislature, elects the
executive, this is, for example, the case in Germany.
Although the structure and timing of our principal-agent game is consistent with real-
world hierarchical decision-making procedures, there is a more general interpretation of
the principal-agent relationship in our game setting. Because of the strategic interaction at
the international level, the principals in both countries have an incentive to commit to a
less green policy in order to free-ride on the abatement efforts of the other country which
arises due to the strategic substitutability of emission permit choices under an interna-
tional permit market regime. However, principals need a credible commitment device, as
the equilibrium permit choice under strategic delegation is at odds with their own prefer-
ences. The strategic delegation framework in our model provides such a commitment device
that enables the principal to credibly pursue a less green environmental policy. Yet, any
other credible commitment device, such as investments in adaptation to climate change or
13 For this interpretation, we require that θi,P = 1 is indeed the median in the preference distribution
with respect to environmental damages. This can always be achieved by an appropriate normalization. In
addition, it is straightforward to show that the voters can be ordered according to the preference parameter
θi, with ∂ωi/∂θi < 0. As a consequence, the median voter theorem applies.
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in long-lived, emissions-intensive energy infrastructure would result in a similar race to the
bottom whereby principals in both countries would issue more emission allowances than
would be the case if they could not credibly commit to such a policy.14 Thus, our results
are qualitatively robust beyond the particular principal-agent relationship considered in our
model framework.
Finally, our analysis reveals that principals are not necessarily subjected to the race to the
bottom in delegating to agents with less green preferences than they exhibit themselves. In
our setting, they have an instrument at their disposal that enables them to defend themselves
against strategic delegation and its adverse impacts – they can choose the domestic permit
markets regime in which no incentives for strategic delegation exist. We find that a principal
makes use of this instrument whenever the costs of strategic delegation outweigh her benefits
of establishing an international permit market. It is conceivable that similar instruments
exist in other contexts which are able to mitigate the adverse effects of strategic delegation.
8 Conclusion
We have analysed the non-cooperative formation of an international permit market in a
hierarchical policy framework, in which a principal in each country chooses an agent who
is in charge of determining the domestic emissions allowance. We find that the principals
in both countries select agents who have (weakly) less green preferences than they have
themselves. When emission allowance choices are strategic substitutes, delegation allows the
principals to credibly commit to a less green policy and thus shift – ceteris paribus – part of
the abatement burden to the other country. This is, for example, the case if an international
permit market comes into existence, even for constant marginal damages. At the same
time, delegation and its adverse consequences on global emissions make the formation of an
international market less likely than under the benchmark case of self-representation.
While our results may explain the reluctance to establish non-cooperative international
permit markets, despite their seemingly favourable characteristics, they also constitute the
more general warning that treating countries as single welfare-maximizing agents in the
international policy arena may be an oversimplification. As a consequence, the analysis
of the nexus between domestic and international (environmental) policy seems to be a
promising avenue for future research.
14 Copeland (1990), Buchholz and Konrad (1994), Buchholz and Haslbeck (1997) and Beccherle and Tirole
(2011) discuss technological choices and investments as commitment devices through which a country can
improve its position in negotiations concerning an environmental agreement.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Inserting the market equilibrium condition ei = ωi into the best response function (12) and
solving for ωi yields dominant strategies for each country i which, together, constitute the
unique Nash equilibrium:
ωDi (Θ) = i − θiφiδi . (A.1)
Global emissions are then given by:
ED(Θ) = − (θiφiδi + θ−iφ−iδ−i) . (A.2)

Proof of Corollary 1
Conditions (13) follow directly from equations (A.1) and (A.2):
∂ωDi (Θ)
∂θi
= −φiδi < 0 , (A.3)
∂ω−iD(Θ)
∂θi
= 0 , (A.4)
∂ED(Θ)
∂θi
= −φiδi < 0 . (A.5)

Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the equilibrium permit market price p
(
EI(Θ)
)
is given by:
p
(
EI(Θ)
)
= 12 (θiδi + θ−iδ−i) . (A.6)
Inserting into equation (9) yields for the global emission level in the Nash equilibrium:
EI(Θ) = − 12 (θiδi + θ−iδ−i) . (A.7)
Inserting p
(
EI(Θ)
)
and EI(Θ) into the reaction function yields the permit choices in the
Nash equilibrium:
ωIi (Θ) = i +
1
2φ−i (θiδi + θ−iδ−i)− φθiδi . (A.8)
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Proof of Corollary 2
Conditions (18) follow directly from equations (A.7) and (A.8):
∂ωIi (Θ)
∂θi
= −δi
(
φi +
1
2φ−i
)
< 0 , (A.9)
∂ωI−i(Θ)
∂θi
= 12φiδi > 0 , (A.10)
∂EI(Θ)
∂θi
= −12φδi < 0 . (A.11)

Proof of Proposition 3
Taking into account that dω−i/dθi = 0, the reaction function (21) reads:
(1− θi)D′i
dED(Θ)
dθi
= 0 . (A.12)
As D′i > 0 and dED(Θ)/dθi < 0, the equation can only hold if θi = 1. Thus, θi = 1 is
a dominant strategy for both principals in case of a domestic permit market regime. As a
consequence, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at stage two of the
game in which both principals represent themselves, i.e., θDi = 1.

Proof of Proposition 4
Using the functional forms (1) for the reaction function (23) yields:
θi(θ−i) =
2φ
3φi + 2φ−i
− θ−i φiδ−i
δi(3φi + 2φ−i)
. (A.13)
As both reaction functions are decreasing linear functions, they intersect exactly once at:
θIi = 1−
φi(δi + δ−i)
3δiφ
. (A.14)

Proof of Corollary 3
The first and third property immediately follow from (A.14). To show the second property,
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we differentiate this equation with respect to δi and φi, yielding:
∂θIi
∂δi
= 3δ−iφiφ(3δiφ)2
> 0 , ∂θ
I
i
∂φi
= −3δi(δi + δ−i)φ−i(3δiφ)2 < 0 . (A.15)
Comparing (A.14) for i and −i, we obtain condition (25), which obviously holds if δi < δ−i
and φi > φ−i. 
Proof of Proposition 5
While it is obvious from equation (29) that if country i is the permit seller, i.e., δi < δ−i,
its principal is always strictly better off under an international permit market than under
domestic permit markets, this is not necessarily the case if country i is the permit buyer,
i.e., δi > δ−i. In this case, principal i consents to an international permit market if the
following two conditions hold simultaneously:
δi
δ−i
<
2φ−i + φi
2φ−i − 3φi ∧
φi
φ−i
<
2(δi − δ−i)
3δi + δ−i
< 1 . (A.16)
As country −i is the permit seller, for an international permit market to form, principal i’s
marginal damages must not be too large relative to principal −i’s marginal damages, and,
since the term on the right-hand side of the latter inequality is smaller than one, a necessary
condition is that φi < φ−i.
To show under which condition global emissions are lower under an international permit
market regime without delegation, we have to compare (A.2) with (A.7) for ΘP = (1, 1):
EI(ΘP ) < ED(ΘP ) ⇔ 12(δi − δ−i)(φi − φ−i) < 0 . (A.17)
This condition holds if and only if condition (30) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 6
To prove this proposition, we first add and subtract the principal’s payoff under an inter-
national permit market under self-representation, V Ii (ΘP ):
∆Vi(Θ) =
[
V Ii (ΘP )− V Di (ΘD)
]
+
[
V Ii (ΘI)− V Ii (ΘP )
]
. (A.18)
Because the principal does not wish to delegate in the case of domestic permit markets, it
holds that V Di (ΘD) = V Di (ΘP ). Thus, the first bracketed term in the above equation, which
we denote by Γnodeli , is equal to equation (29). For the second bracketed term, which we
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denote by Γdeli , we obtain in case of an interior solution:
Γdeli =
1
72(δi + δ−i)
2(3φi − 10φ−i) R 0 ⇔ φi R 103 φ−i . (A.19)
Second, we distinguish two cases:
(i) Condition (30) holds, i.e., δi > δ−i, φi < φ−i. Then, we obtain:
Γnodeli R 0 , Γdeli < 0 ,
Γnodel−i > 0 , Γdel−i R 0 .
(A.20)
Thus, country i, which is a permit buyer in case of an international permit market
without delegation, is worse off due to delegation, while country−i, which is the permit
seller without delegation, may gain or lose due to delegation. As the permit buyer
(country i) is pivotal for the formation of an international permit market without
delegation, this result implies that strategic delegation makes the formation of an
international permit market less likely.
(ii) Suppose that δi > δ−i, φi > φ−i. Then, we obtain:
Γnodeli < 0 , Γdeli R 0 ,
Γnodel−i > 0 , Γdel−i < 0 .
(A.21)
Under these conditions, an international permit market would not have formed without
delegation, as country i, the permit buyer, prefers a domestic permit market regime.
However, country i might gain under strategic delegation if φi > 10φ−i/3. In fact, an
international permit market can only form in case of delegation if the following two
inequalities hold simultaneously:
Γnodeli + Γdeli > 0 ∧ Γnodel−i + Γdel−i > 0 . (A.22)
This can only hold if:
Γnodeli + Γnodel−i > −
(
Γdeli + Γdel−i
)
. (A.23)
Plugging in equations (29) and (A.19), it can be shown that the left-hand side of
this inequality is strictly negative while the right-hand side is strictly positive for
the assumed parameter constellation, leading to a contradiction. Therefore, the two
inequalities (A.22) do not hold simultaneously. As a consequence, it cannot happen
that an international permit market regime is established under strategic delegation
while it was not to be established without delegation.
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Proof of Proposition 7
To show the first part, we compare global emissions on an international permit market with
and without delegation and obtain:
EI(ΘI)− EI(ΘP ) = 16φ(δi + δi) > 0 . (A.24)
Thus, delegation leads to higher global emissions in an international permit market regime.
For the second part, we compare global emissions between the domestic and the international
permit market regime. Global emissions decrease under regime R = I compared to regime
R = D if and only if:
ED − EI > 0 ⇔ φi(δ−i − 2δi) + φ−i(δi − 2δ−i) > 0 . (A.25)
An international permit market forms if and only if ∆Vi > 0 and ∆V−i > 0 hold simultane-
ously. A necessary condition, is that ∆Vi + ∆V−i > 0:
∆Vi + ∆V−i =
1
18 [(2δi + 5δ−i(φiδ−i − 2φiδi) + (5δi + 2δ−i)(φ−iδi − 2φ−iδ−i)]
<
7δi
18 [φ(δ−i − 2δi) + φ−i(δi − 2δ−i)] ,
(A.26)
where we used δi > δ−i to derive the second line. Thus, an international permit market
can only be mutually beneficial if the condition for global emissions to decrease, equation
(A.25), holds. 
Details of the numerical illustrations
For the numerical exercise in Section 6 we parameterize functions (1) using relative energy
productivities from the OECD Green Growth Indicators database15 for the year 2013. As
there is no explicit data on energy productivities for the EU as a whole, we take the pro-
ductivity of all European OECD countries together as a proxy. According to these numbers,
China exhibits approximately one third of the energy productivity of the OECD. In addi-
tion, China emits approximately three times as many greenhouse gas emissions as the EU.
15 DOI:10.1787/9789264202030-en
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θ2
θ1
θ2
θ1
Figure 2: Reaction functions of the principals in country 1 (China, solid) and country 2 (EU,
dashed) under the regimes R = D (black) and R = I (gray) at the delegation
stage for δ1 = 0.3 (left) and δ1 = 0.1 (right).
As a consequence, we obtain for the parameters φi:16
B′1
B′2
= 1
2
φ2
φ1
⇒ φ1
φ2
= 1
2
B′2
B′1
= 3 · 3 = 9 . (A.27)
Following Carlsson et al. (2012) who find that Swedish consumers exhibit roughly four times
the WTP for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions than Chinese consumers, we set
the exogenous parameters to:
1 = 3 , 2 = 1 , φ1 = 0.9 , φ2 = 0.1 , δ1 = 0.15 , δ2 = 0.6 . (A.28)
The results for this benchmark case are shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.
As WTP estimates are plagued by significantly higher systematic estimation errors than
carbon efficiency, we run a small sensitivity analysis on the WTP parameters. To this end,
we calculate the results for two additional specifications, one in which we increase China’s
WTP to δ1 = 0.3, i.e., China exhibits half the WTP of the EU, and one in which we decrease
China’s WTP to δ1 = 0.1, i.e., China exhibits only one sixth of the EU’s WTP. The results
are shown in Table 2 and Figure 2.
For δ1 = 0.3, we obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium on the delegation stage in
which the principal in country 1 delegates to an agent that has a positive WTP for emission
reductions. For δ1 = 0.1, we find that the principal in country 1 delegates in equilibrium
16 We calibrate such that for any positive fraction of business-as-usual emissions country 2 exhibits three
times the marginal carbon efficiency of country 1.
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Results for δ1 = 0.3:
Without strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θR2 ωR1 ωR2 eR1 eR2 ER V R1 V R2
R = D 1 1 2.73 0.94 3.67 3.86 2.78
R = I 1 1 2.75 0.81 2.60 0.96 3.55 3.91 2.79
With strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θR2 ωR1 ωR2 eR1 eR2 ER V R1 V R2
R = D 1 1 2.73 0.94 3.67 3.86 2.78
R = I 0.1 0.95 3 0.7 2.73 0.97 3.70 3.93 2.69
Results for δ1 = 0.1:
Without strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θR2 ωR1 ωR2 eR1 eR2 ER V R1 V R2
R = D 1 1 2.91 0.94 3.85 4.61 2.67
R = I 1 1 2.94 0.72 2.69 0.97 3.65 4.67 2.72
With strategic delegation
Regime θR1 θR2 ωR1 ωR2 eR1 eR2 ER V R1 V R2
R = D 1 1 2.91 0.94 3.85 4.61 2.67
R = I −1.10 0.96 3.13 0.63 2.79 0.98 3.77 4.68 2.66
Table 2: Overview of the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria without and
with strategic delegation for the sensitivity analysis.
to an agent with an even more negative preference parameter. In both cases, we observe
that an international permit market forms without delegation but not in case of strategic
delegation.
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